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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
"The entire encounter was a fishing expedition." (R., p.68.) But although the district
court made that finding of fact in regards to Adam Andrew Nelson's motion to suppress, the
court still denied his motion. The court determined that there was no problem with officers
approaching and questioning Mr. Nelson when he was about to wash his car before going to
work early one morning. The officers learned from him that he was on parole. The lead officer
in the interaction eventually searched Mr. Nelson's car and found methamphetamine.

The

district court determined Mr. Nelson had no basis to challenge the search of the car.
After entering a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance,
Mr. Nelson appealed. On appeal, Mr. Nelson asserts the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress. Under the circumstances here, the officers seized Mr. Nelson at the start of
their interaction with him, before they learned he was on parole.

Reasonable articulable

suspicion did not support the officers' warrantless seizure of Mr. Nelson. The evidence obtained
as a result of the unlawful seizure must be suppressed.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court's factual findings in its Decision and Order Re: Motion to
Suppress, Mr. Nelson "was at a self-service car wash around 4:00 a.m. to wash his car before
going to work.

Two police officers who were passing by decided to stop and talk to him

although he was doing nothing suspicious." 1 (R., p.68.) The lead officer immediately asked
Mr. Nelson what he was doing, and he told the officers he was washing his car before going to

1

Before the district court, Mr. Nelson explained that the incident took place in December, and
the officers were from the Boise Police Department. (See R., p.31.)
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work. (R., p.68.) "The officer then asked him if he was on probation or parole and he replied
that he was on parole." (R., p.68.) The officers continued to question Mr. Nelson, asking if he
had a gun or suspicious items. 2 (R., p.68.) The district court found, "The entire encounter was a
fishing expedition." (R., p.68.)
Mr. Nelson was cooperative, and had no outstanding warrants.

(R., pp.68-69.) The

district court found: "Although he said several times that he was worried he would be late for
work, the officers continued to ask him for consent to search the vehicle.

Eventually, the

defendant consented to the officers' request to search the vehicle." (R., p.69.) The officers
found methamphetamine in the car. (R., p.69.)
As a condition of parole, Mr. Nelson had signed a supervision agreement containing a
search waiver:
5. Search: I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or for
which I am the controlling authority conducted by any agent of IDOC or a law
enforcement officer. I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth Amendment and
the Idaho constitution concerning searches.
(R., p.68.)

2

Defendant's Exhibit A, the body camera footage from the lead officer, shows further details
from the onset of the interaction here. (See generally De£ Ex. A, 00:00 - 01 :35.) As Mr. Nelson
discussed before the district court, the other officer first asked Mr. Nelson how he was doing.
(See R., p.32.) The lead officer then asked Mr. Nelson "a direct series of questions over
approximately 45 seconds, including the following: 'Are you washing your car? Is it registered
to you? Is anyone else inside? Where do you live? Do you have your ID on you? Have you
ever been arrested? Are you on probation or parole? Which one and what for? Are you good
with your PO?"' (See R., p.32.) During that time, Mr. Nelson "answers all questions and begins
to take his identification out of his wallet," and about 45 seconds into the questioning,
Mr. Nelson gave the lead officer his driver's license. (See R., p.32.) Defendant's Exhibit A
shows Mr. Nelson told the officers he was on parole before he handed his identification to the
lead officer. (See De£ Ex. A, 00:49-01:14.)
2

The State charged Mr. Nelson by Information with possession of a controlled substance,
felony, LC. § 37-2732(c), and possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, LC. § 37-2734A.
(R., pp.23-24.) Mr. Nelson pleaded not guilty to the charges. (R., p.27.)
Mr. Nelson subsequently filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, asserting his statements
and all other evidence should be suppressed "on the grounds that it was illegally obtained
without a warrant and in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution." (R., p.29.) In his Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Suppress Evidence, Mr. Nelson asserted he had been unlawfully detained without
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (R., pp.36-39.) He asserted, "Although [the] officers
attempt a voluntary encounter, they immediately begin a direct series of questioning
[Mr. Nelson] without pause on his personal information, whereabouts, and criminal history."
(R., p.37.) Mr. Nelson was "otherwise involved in lawful activity at this time-preparing to
wash his car at an open business-and does not appear to otherwise be engaged in any criminal
activity." (R., p.37.) He then asserted, "Accordingly, a reasonable person in this positionapproached by two uniformed police officers on each side, at night, with a visible patrol car in
view, consistently questioning without pause-would not feel free to leave or decline to respond
to an officer's question." (R., p.37.)
Mr. Nelson also noted that, within 45 seconds of approaching, the lead officer retained
Mr. Nelson's identification, "initiating a clear seizure of his person." (See R., p.37.) While
holding the identification, the officer conducted a patdown search for weapons on Mr. Nelson
and shined a flashlight through the windows of Mr. Nelson's vehicle. (See R., pp.37-38.) The
lead officer held the identification while conducting a records check, and Mr. Nelson asserted
that, while that was happening over the next two minutes, the officers effectively blocked his
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access to leave with his car and belongings. (See R., p.38.) The officers then questioned him for
almost six more minutes. (See R., p.38.) Mr. Nelson asserted the circumstances amounted "to a
clear show of authority by police without reasonable articulable suspicion, and thus an unlawful
detention." (R., p.38.)
Additionally, Mr. Nelson asserted his "own words show his submission to the officers'
show of authority." (R., p.38.) Mr. Nelson had expressed frustration that he would be late for
work, that he did not understand why he was being questioned, and that he felt he was being
harassed at a car wash. (R., p.38.) He also asked permission to retrieve his gloves and to smoke
a cigarette, "showing he did not feel unconstrained in his movements." (R., p.38.) The officers
nonetheless continued asking him the same questions, without telling him he was free to leave or
that he did not have to answer questions or give consent to search his car. (See R., pp.38-39.)
Mr. Nelson concluded: "This encounter amounts to a fishing expedition by officers until
they receive the answer they want. A reasonable person in [Mr. Nelson's] position would not
feel free to leave under the officers' clear show of authority and no specific and articulable facts
show any criminal activity was afoot." (R., p.39.) Thus, the officers "initiated an unlawful
detention of [Mr. Nelson] without reasonable articulable suspicion in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution," and "[a]ny and all evidence and
statements of [Mr. Nelson] discovered as a result of this unlawful detention must be suppressed."
(R., p.39.)
Mr. Nelson also asserted that the warrantless entry and search of his vehicle was made
without valid consent.

(R., p.39.) The State filed a State's Objection and Memorandum in

Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, arguing Mr. Nelson lacked standing to contest his
detention and the subsequent search of his person and vehicle. (R., p.58.)
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At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties did not call any witnesses, but
stipulated to admitting Defense Exhibit A, the body camera footage from the lead officer, into
evidence. (See 4/15/19 Tr., p.9, L.3 - p.12, L.5.) Mr. Nelson asserted, "We believe that the
initial approach of Mr. Nelson, despite the Fourth Amendment waiver, is still an unlawful
detention, for no reason." (4/15/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.16-18.) Defense counsel asserted, "This goes
beyond that of a voluntary stop, including factors based on the cases submitted in my brief,
including that it's dark at night, it's two officers against one, it's officers in uniform with
weapons displayed surrounding the vehicle, blocking him access to leaving if he were to do so."
(4/15/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.18-24.) Mr. Nelson further emphasized that the officers had continued to
question him without pause, while he had been forthright, polite, and compliant. (See 4/15/19
Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, L.6.) Moreover, he asked the district court to grant the motion to suppress
"at the very least on the grounds that it was a coercive environment and that but for the officers
essentially unlawfully detaining him to begin with, they would not have learned that he was on
parole or had any type ofFourth Amendment waiver." (4/15/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-15.)
The State repeated its argument that Mr. Nelson did not have standing, based on his
diminished expectation of privacy from the search waiver. (See 4/15/19 Tr., p.15, L.20 - p.16,
L.11.) The district court disagreed: "[I]t's just that I wouldn't call it a standing issue. A person
who is searched has a right to raise the issue. So that's not standing." (4/15/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.1316.) The court stated, "The problem is, though, that a person who is on parole and has signed a
waiver of this type has made a tradeofffor greater freedom." (4/15/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.16-18.)
The district court then stated, "[T]he case law is quite clear that a police officer can go
up, always go up and talk to somebody." (4/15/19 Tr., p.17, Ls.3-5.) Per the court, "If they're
parked, they're not stopping them, they're not using their lights or sirens to force them to stop,
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they can go talk to people, but there would be nothing in the conversation that's related in the
materials in front of me that would warrant doing more than that." (4/15/19 Tr., p.17, Ls.5-10.)
The district court continued: "[S]o it really comes down to the fact that being on parole means
that you consent to search without a warrant, and they were fairly quickly aware of the parole
status, so that's the problem. It's just that a person who is on parole does not have the full rights
of a person not on parole." (4/15/19 Tr., p.17, Ls.10-14.) The court thought a search waiver
such as the one in this case would allow a law enforcement officer to search once they were
"aware of the parole .... " (See 4/15/19, p.17, Ls.15-22.)
Later, the district court issued its Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.6872.) The court determined, "When a person is in a public place, like the car wash in this case, no
Constitutional right is implicated when a police officer walks over and talks to that person."
(R., p.69.) The car wash here "was a 24 hour self-serve car wash open for business at any time."
(R., p.69.) The district court stated: "All encounters between law enforcement officers and
citizens do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

There is no unconstitutional seizure of a

person just because a police officer approaches someone on a street or in another public place,
and asks him questions." (R., pp.69-70 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991);

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho 732, 735 (Ct. App. 2018), rev.
denied (June 7, 2018); State v. Jordan, 122 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1992).)

The court then

determined: "There was no problem when the officers parked their patrol vehicle and went over
to talk to the defendant at the car wash. Within less than a minute, the officers learned that the
defendant was on parole." (R., p. 70.)
Next, the district court determined that Mr. Nelson "had a dramatically diminished
expectation of privacy because he was on parole and had consented to allow law enforcement
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officers to search him and his car. The search of his vehicle by the law enforcement officers fell
within the scope of the type of search he expressly consented to, therefore, it was objectively
reasonable." (R., p.71.) The court noted that the Idaho Supreme Court had upheld similar
probation consent terms. (R., pp.71-72 (citing State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206 (2009).) The
district court determined the search of Mr. Nelson's car "is justified because of his waiver even
though the officers conducted 'a suspicionless search' as they did in [Samson v. California, 547
U.S. 843 (2006)]." (R., p.72.)
Thus, the district court concluded that Mr. Nelson "signed a valid, extensive waiver of his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches of his person and property when
he was paroled. He was approached and questioned in a place open to the public. He quickly
acknowledged being on parole. Later, his vehicle was searched." (R., p.72.) Finding "no basis
to challenge the search of his vehicle," the court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.72.)
Mr. Nelson subsequently entered into a conditional plea agreement where he would plead
guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance, while reserving his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress.

(See R., pp.73-82.) The district court imposed a unified

sentence of three years, with one-half year fixed, to be served concurrently with the sentence in
the case where Mr. Nelson had been on parole. (See R., pp.84-85.)
Mr. Nelson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction and Order of Commitment. (R., pp.87-89.)

7

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nelson's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nelson's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Nelson asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. As

discussed above, the district court found, "The entire encounter was a fishing expedition."
(R., p.68.) Yet the district court determined: "There was no problem when the officers parked
their patrol vehicle and went over to talk to the defendant at the car wash. Within less than a
minute, the officers learned that the defendant was on parole." (R., p.70.) However, under the
circumstances here, the officers seized Mr. Nelson at the start of their interaction with him,
before they learned he was on parole.

Reasonable articulable suspicion did not support the

officers' warrantless seizure of Mr. Nelson. The evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful
seizure must be suppressed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated. An appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and freely reviews
the trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Hankey,
134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000).

C.

The Officers Seized Mr. Nelson At The Start Of Their Interaction With Him, Before
They Learned He Was On Parole
Mr. Nelson asserts the officers seized him at the start of their interaction, before the

officers learned he was on parole. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, provide protection against unreasonable searches and
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seizures. 3 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17.

"When a defendant seeks to

suppress evidence that is alleged to have been obtained as a result of an illegal seizure, the
defendant bears the burden of proving that a seizure occurred." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho
482, 486 (2009).

"The test to determine if an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment

purposes is an objective one, evaluating whether under the totality of the circumstances 'a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter."' State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 436 (1991)).
In Bostick, the United States Supreme Court observed: "Our cases make it clear that a
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about
his business,' the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required." Bostick, 501
U.S. at 434 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)). "The encounter will
not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature." Id. Earlier, the
United States Supreme Court had noted:

"Obviously, not all personal intercourse between

policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.

Only when the officer, by means of

physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
The test for determining whether a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment "provides that the police can be said to have seized an individual 'only if, in
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
3

While Mr. Nelson asserted the evidence against him should be suppressed under both the
Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 17, he did not specifically articulate how the analysis under
the Idaho Constitution would differ from the analysis under the United States Constitution. (See
R., pp.36-39, 70.)
10

believed that he was not free to leave."' Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988)
(quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). "Examples of circumstances
that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
Further, for a seizure to occur, the subject must yield to the officer's show of authority or
application of physical force. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625-26.
Here, the totality of the circumstances shows that the officers seized Mr. Nelson at the
start of their interaction with him, before the officers learned that he was on parole. Although
the lead officer's body camera footage indicates the officers did not activate their lights or sirens,
and they did not completely block off Mr. Nelson's ability to leave the car wash stall (see Def.
Ex. A, 00:00-00:32), an examination of all the circumstances demonstrates a reasonable person
in Mr. Nelson's situation would have believed he was not free to leave.

Mr. Nelson was

confronted in the early morning hours by two uniformed officers. The officers parked their
patrol car right next to the stall where Mr. Nelson was about to wash his car. (See Def. Ex. A,
00:00-00-32.) As the officers approached, the other officer's hand was near his weapon holster.
(See Def Ex. A, 00:29; see also 4/15/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.21-23 (defense counsel asserting, "it's
officers in uniform with weapons displayed surrounding the vehicle .... ").)
The lead officer then almost immediately began questioning Mr. Nelson, without first
asking if he would be willing to answer some questions. (See Def Ex. A, 00:30-00:40.) The
lead officer's inquiry swiftly went into questions on potential suspicious or criminal activity.
One of the lead officer's first questions to Mr. Nelson was whether the car was registered to him,
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implying the lead officer thought the car did not belong to Mr. Nelson. (See De£ Ex. A, 00:3600:42.) The lead officer soon thereafter asked Mr. Nelson where he lived, and if he had ever
been arrested. (See De£ Ex. A., 00:45-00:57.) Those questions also implied the lead officer
thought Mr. Nelson was involved in suspicious or criminal activity. When considering all the
circumstances, a reasonable person in Mr. Nelson's position would not have felt free to disregard
these questions on suspicious or criminal activity, directed at the person, and asked by one of two
uniformed officers in an early morning interaction. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. In sum, under
the totality of the circumstances here, a reasonable person would have believed they were not
free to leave. See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574.
Moreover, Mr. Nelson yielded to the officers' show of authority. As the district court
found, Mr. Nelson was cooperative. (See R., p.68.) The lead officer's body camera footage also
indicates that Mr. Nelson answered all of the questions posed by the lead officer. (See De£ Ex.
A, 00:35-01 :20.) Thus, because a reasonable person would have believed they were not free to
leave under the totality of the circumstances, and Mr. Nelson yielded to the officers' show of
authority, the officers seized Mr. Nelson at the start of their interaction, before the officers
learned he was on parole. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625-26; Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574.

D.

Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Did Not Support The Officers' Warrantless Seizure Of
Mr. Nelson
Mr. Nelson asserts reasonable articulable susp1c1on did not support the officer's

warrantless seizure here. "When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it
was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009). "The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement has
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been held to apply to brief investigatory detentions." Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19). In
determining whether a seizure was ''unreasonable," a court first inquires into "whether the
officer's action was justified at its inception."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.

"The level of

justification required depends on the intrusiveness of the seizure." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22). A court next considers whether the seizure ''was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry,
392 U.S. at 20.
While a seizure typically must be based on probable cause to be reasonable, "limited
investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by an
officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a
crime." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-500 (1983)).
Reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." See Terry, 392 U.S. at
21. "Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause," in that it can be
established with information that is different in quantity or content, or even less reliable, than
that required to establish probable cause.

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

However, the officer must be able to articulate something more than an "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."' See id. at 329; Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The inquiry into
whether an officer had reasonable suspicion takes into account "the totality of the circumstances"
known to the officers at the time of the seizure. See Cortez v. United States, 449 U.S. 411, 41718 (1981); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.
In the instant case, at the inception of the seizure, the officers did not have reasonable
articulable suspicion that Mr. Nelson had committed, or was about to commit, a crime. At the
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time of the seizure, the officers knew Mr. Nelson was at an open 24 hour self-serve car wash,
and he had stated that he was about to wash his car before going to work. (See R., pp.68-69.)
Additionally, before the officers learned Mr. Nelson was on parole, they knew that Mr. Nelson
indicated that the car belonged to him, nobody else was in the car, he lived in the city, and he had
been arrested. (See Def Ex. A, 00:35-1 :00.) Thus, under the totality of the circumstances
known to the officers at that point in their interaction with Mr. Nelson, the officers did not have
specific, articulable facts to indicate that criminal activity might be afoot. Presented with a man
about to wash his car before going to work in the early morning hours, the officers did not have
even a hunch of criminal activity here. Much as the district court found, "The entire encounter
was a fishing expedition." (See R., p.68.) Thus, reasonable, articulable suspicion did not support
the officers' warrantless seizure of Mr. Nelson. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. The officers'
seizure was not justified at its inception.

E.

The Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Unlawful Seizure Must Be Suppressed
Mr. Nelson asserts the evidence obtained as a result of the officers' unlawful seizure must

be suppressed. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures "generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of
the illegal government action." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-11. This exclusionary rule "applies to
evidence obtained directly from the illegal government action and to evidence discovered
through the exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 811
(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,
846 (2004)). The test is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which the instant objection has been made has been come at through exploitation of the original
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illegality, or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Id.
(quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).
Here, because reasonable, articulable suspicion did not support the officers' warrantless
seizure of Mr. Nelson, and the State did not argue another exception to the warrant requirement
applied to justify the seizure, the seizure of Mr. Nelson was unlawful. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at
811. As Mr. Nelson asserted before the district court, but for the unlawful seizure, the officers
would not have learned that he was on parole.

(See 4/15/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-15.) Indeed,

without the officers beginning their "fishing expedition" here, the lead officer would not have
had occasion to ask Mr. Nelson ifhe was on probation or parole. (See Def Ex. A, 00:35-01:07.)
Thus, the officers exploited the original illegality to find the evidence located through the search
waiver, Mr. Nelson's consent to search, and the subsequent search of the car. See Bishop, 146
Idaho at 811. Under the exclusionary rule, the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful
seizure must be suppressed.

See id.

The district court therefore erred when it denied

Mr. Nelson's motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court's order of judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to
suppress.
DATED this 11 th day of December, 2019.

Isl Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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